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Abstract
This paper characterizes income and commodity taxation as the
outcome of a noncooperative Nash game in a two-country economy
where one of the countries produces an environmentally clean good,
while the other produces a dirty good. Among the results, it is shown
that the commodity tax on the dirty good implemented by each coun-
try does not contain any term that directly serves to correct for the
external eﬀect. Instead, the country producing the dirty good inter-
nalizes part of the domestic external eﬀect by choosing a relatively
high marginal income tax rate.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the literature on transboundary environmental problems1, it is recognized
that some kind of cooperation is generally required in order to reach a globally
optimal resource allocation. The reason is that, in the absence of cooperation,
part of the external eﬀects of environmental damage will remain uninternal-
ized, even if all other policies are optimally chosen from the point of view of
society, since domestic objectives typically govern individual countries. At
the same time, and despite the presence of certain international agreements,
there is still considerable freedom for individual countries to choose their own
policy on a national basis. As a consequence, it is important to understand
the incentives on which individual countries base their policy decisions. This
paper analyzes environmental policy as part of the outcome of a noncooper-
ative Nash game between countries, where each country solves a mixed tax
problem conditional on the policies chosen by other countries. The purpose is
to introduce some additional elements into this framework; namely, produc-
tion specialization and policy incentives associated with endogenous world
market producer prices.
The study of environmental policy in the context of optimal taxation
is typically based on ’one-country’ model economies, where environmental
damage is generated by the aggregate demand of a certain commodity; often
referred to as a ’dirty’ good. A seminal contribution is Sandmo (1975) deal-
ing with environmental policy in a second best economy, where commodity
taxes are used to raise a given public revenue. His main result is that the
social value of the marginal external eﬀect enters the tax formula for the
1Transboundary environmental problems have received a lot of attention in the liter-
ature; see e.g. Mäler (1989), Barrett (1990, 1994), Tahvonen (1994, 1995) and Aronsson
and Löfgren (2000).
2commodity that gives rise to environmental damage, whereas it has no direct
eﬀect on the tax formulas for other commodities. A similar result is derived
by Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997), although their study is based on a mixed
tax problem, where the linear commodity taxes are supplemented by a non-
linear income tax2. Aronsson and Blomquist (2004) extend the framework
used by Pirttilä and Tuomala into a two-country economy, where the inter-
actions between the countries refer to labor mobility and spillover eﬀects of
environmental damage; they do not consider specialization in the production.
Their contribution is to compare the tax policy supporting a noncooperative
Nash equilibrium with that of a cooperative equilibrium. A basic conclusion
in most earlier studies is that environmental damage typically provides an
incentive to modify the commodity tax structure3; let be that the corrective
terms entering the commodity tax formulas diﬀer depending on whether each
country chooses its environmental policy in isolation or cooperates with other
countries.
The studies mentioned above are either based on one-country model
economies or, in case a global economy is being considered, a production
structure without specialization. An important question is whether this as-
sumption is important for our understanding of environmental policy. The
production possibilities facing real world market economies give rise to spe-
cialization (at least to some extent), implying that diﬀerent countries concen-
trate on producing diﬀerent types of commodities. As a consequence, some
countries become exporters of dirty goods (e.g. the oil producing countries),
2See also the related work by e.g. Cremer and Gahvari (2001) and Cremer et al. (2001).
3See also the literature dealing with environmental tax reforms in the presence of other
tax distortions, e.g. Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996),
Schneider (1997), Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998), Aronsson (1999), Koskela and
Schöb (1999) and Parry et al. (1999).
3whereas others become importers. In this paper, we take the specialization
argument to its extreme point by considering full specialization in the pro-
duction. Our analysis is based on a stylized model with a world economy
comprising two countries and two commodities; one of the countries produces
an environmentally clean good and the other a dirty good. The two com-
modities are consumed by the residents in both countries, and the aggregate
(worldwide) consumption of the dirty good gives rise to environmental dam-
age. This means that the resulting equilibrium involves international trade
as well as transboundary spillover eﬀects of environmental damage. Further-
more, our framework implies that the national governments recognize how
their policies inﬂuence the world market producer prices and incorporate this
information into their optimization problems; one of the driving forces behind
the results. Each country is characterized by two ability-types, implying that
environmental policy is studied simultaneously with redistribution; a starting
point which appears reasonable to us. The government in each country faces
a mixed tax problem, where the set of national tax instruments includes a
nonlinear income tax and linear commodity taxes.
Our results show that, if the resource allocation is a noncooperative Nash
equilibrium, where each country chooses its policy in isolation and treats the
policy variables of the other country as exogenous, the national governments
do not use commodity taxation for the purpose of internalizing the domestic
external eﬀects associated with environmental damage. The reason is that,
for a given level of production, each national government acts as if a re-
duction of the domestic demand for the dirty good leads to a corresponding
increase in consumption elsewhere. Therefore, each country perceives that
the aggregate worldwide demand for the dirty good and, as a consequence,
the environmental damage will be unaﬀe c t e db yi t so w nc o m m o d i t yt a xo n
4the dirty good.
If policies aimed at the demand side of the economy will be ineﬀective to
combat the environmental problem, national governments can only reduce
emissions by targeting the supply side. Export/import tariﬀsm a ys e e mt o
be an obvious set of instrument to accomplish this task. However, one can
easily argue that such instruments are not fully available in a world economy
with free trade agreements4.T a k i n ga l s ot h i sa r g u m e n tt oi t se x t r e m ep o i n t ,
we disregard trade policy in what follows; instead, our focus will be on how to
u s ei n c o m et a x a t i o nt oi n ﬂuence the supply side. Our results show that the
eﬀective marginal tax rate facing the residents in the country that produces
the dirty good depends explicitly on the domestic marginal value of reduced
environmental damage. As such, this eﬀect works to increase the eﬀective
marginal tax rates which, in turn, reduces the labor supply and the output
of the dirty good.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains a description of
the model and a characterization of the outcome of private optimization. In
section 3, we address the income and commodity tax structure implicit in a
noncooperative Nash equilibrium and present our results. Section 4 contains
a summary and discussion of the results.
2 The Model
Consider a two-country economy, where the ﬁrms in country C produce an
environmentally clean good, while the ﬁrms in country D produce an envi-
ronmentally dirty good. In all other important respects, the countries are
4This assumption may be justiﬁed by the GATT agreements, which restrict the use of
trade barriers.
5identical. We neglect migration in what follows by assuming that the popu-
lations are immobile. There are two types of consumers in each country; a
low-ability type (denoted by superindex 1) and a high-ability type (denoted
by superindex 2). This distinction refers to productivity, meaning that the
high-ability type faces a higher before tax wage than the low-ability type. In
each country, we normalize the number of consumers of each ability-type to
one.





,w h e r eXh,i is a vector of private goods consumed by ability-
type i (i =1 ,2)i nc o u n t r yh (h = C,D), Zh,i is leisure consumed by the same
individual, while E denotes the environmental damage. Leisure is, in turn,
deﬁned as Zh,i = H −Lh,i,w h e r eH is a time endowment and Lh,i the hours
of work. In what follows, we assume that the individual consumers treat E
as exogenous. The vector Xh,i contains a clean good, Xh,i
c , and a dirty good
X
h,i
d . The function U(·) is increasing in Xh,i
c , X
h,i
d and Zh,i,d e c r e a s i n gi n




g o o d s .T h ep r o d u c e rp r i c eo ft h ec l e a ng o o di sn o r m a l i z e dt oo n e ,a n dt h e
clean good is untaxed. The consumer price of the dirty good in country h is
given by Qh
d = Pd+th
d,w h e r ePd is the producer price and th
d the commodity
tax.
Individual i in country h chooses Xh,i
c , X
h,i
d and Lh,i to maximize utility
subject to the budget constraint. Following Christiansen (1984), it is con-
venient to solve the optimization problem in two stages. First, we solve the

























is the vector of consumer prices and Bh,i the after-tax
income. The solution to this problem gives the conditional indirect utility





. In the second stage, the hours of work
are chosen to maximize the conditional indirect utility function subject to
the budget constraint Bh,i = Ih,i −T h
Ih,i
,w h e r eIh,i = wh,iLh,i and T h(·)













I is the marginal income tax rate.
Let us continue with the production side. In each country, the goods
market is competitive, and the production technology is characterized by
constant returns to scale. Given these characteristics, the number of ﬁrms in
each country is not important and will be normalized to one. The production
function is written Y h = Fh 
Lh






















































Therefore, in each country, the wage ratio, wh,1/wh,2, will be a function of












The environmental damage is determined by the aggregate worldwide

















implying that there is a transboundary environmental problem. The world



















This equation implicitly deﬁnes the producer price as a function of private














where Bh =( Bh,1,Bh,2) for h = C,D. Finally, observe that as long as
equation (8) is fulﬁlled, Walras´ law implies that also the world market for
the clean good is in equilibrium.
3 A Noncooperative Nash Equilibrium
We assume that each country faces a utilitarian social welfare function. This





Ability is private information. In accordance with the majority of previous
studies based on the self-selection approach to optimal taxation, we assume
8that the aim of the redistributive policy is to redistribute from high income
earners to low income earners. As a consequence, we would need to prevent
the high-ability type in each country from pretending to be a low-ability





















for h = C,D,w h e r eˆ Lh,2 = φh
nh
Lh,1 while ˆ V h,2 is the utility of the
mimicker.
T h en a t i o n a lt a xi n s t r u m e n t sa r et h ei n c o m et a xf a c i n ge a c ha b i l i t y - t y p e
and the commodity tax on the dirty good. Since we are primarily concerned
with tax policy in this paper, we disregard public provision of public and
















Since Th(·) is a general income tax, it can be used to implement any desired
combination of work hours and private income for both ability-types. It is,
therefore, convenient to use (Bh,1,L h,1,Bh,2,L h,2), instead of the parameters
of T h(·), as direct decision variables in the optimal tax problem. As a con-
sequence, we rewrite the budget constraint of the government in order to
eliminate its direct dependence on Th(·). By using equation (12) together





































The policy variables of the government in country h are Bh,1, Lh,1, Bh,2,
Lh,2 and th
d. In addition, as will be explained below, we use equation (7) as an
explicit constraint in the optimization problem, implying that E is treated
as an additional decision variable. By analogy to the analyses carried out in
previous studies, the latter enables us to derive explicit expressions for the
national shadow prices associated with environmental damage.
The countries are assumed to play a Nash game in the sense that each
country treats the other country’s decision variables as exogenous. Although
conventional, this assumption is important for the results to be derived below.





d as exogenous, while the government in country C treats Y D = F(LD),
BD and tD
d as exogenous. We also assume that the national governments
recognize that their public policies inﬂuence the world market producer price
via equation (9). Since each country treats the decision variables of the other
country as exogenous, it behaves as if the producer price of the dirty good is
a function of its own decision variables, conditional on the decision variables
facing the other country. Let PC
d and PD
d denote these perceptions about Pd






































where the bar ”-” indicates that the variable is treated as exogenous. By
analogy, EC and ED are the perceptions about E held by countries C and
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d and P D
d are given by equations (15) and (16), respectively. Note
that P C
d = PD
d = Pd and EC = ED = E in the Nash equilibrium.


















































































and the ﬁrst order conditions are given in the Appendix.
Equations (15)-(18) are important for the results to be derived below. Let
us begin by brieﬂy discussing some of their implications for environmental
11policy. To exemplify, consider how tD
d aﬀects ED in case the policy variables
























Since the demand curves are downward sloping, equation (21) implies −1 <
∂PD
d /∂tD
d < 0. Then, diﬀerentiating equation (18) with respect to tD
d and
using equation (21), it is straightforward to show that ∂ED/∂tD
d =0 .T h e r e -
fore, from the perspective of country D, commodity taxation is useless as
an instrument for inﬂuencing the aggregate demand for the dirty good. The
intuition is that LD and, therefore, the output of the dirty good are held
constant. This means that the decrease in the domestic demand for the
dirty good leads to increased exports which, in turn, generates downward
pressure on the world market producer price and, as a consequence, a subse-
quent increase in both the foreign and domestic demand for the dirty good.
Equilibrium is restored when PD
d has decreased so much as to equalize the
aggregate demand with the ﬁxed supply. In a similar way, one can show that
∂EC/∂tC
d =0 . Furthermore, these arguments can be generalized to apply to
the other decision variables as well; with a ﬁxed supply of the dirty good,i t
is straightforward to show that the aggregate consumption of the dirty good
is unaﬀected by changes in BC, BD, LC and LD, if the national policies are
chosen in isolation.





∂LD,i > 0 (22)
12for i =1 ,2. As a consequence, policies aimed at the supply of the dirty good
are perceived to inﬂuence the environmental damage. With these preliminar-
ies at our disposal, we are now ready to analyze the optimal tax structure.
3.1 The Shadow Price of Environmental Damage
Previous studies on environmental policy in the context of mixed tax prob-
lems, such as Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997) and Aronsson and Blomquist
(2003), show that the shadow price of environmental damage over the shadow
price of the public budget constraint, µh/γh, plays an important role for the
optimal tax structure. We may interpret µh/γh as the marginal value to







B denote the marginal willingness to pay by
ability-type i in country h to avoid environmental damage. In addition, let


























































measuring the import (export) of the dirty good to (from) the country pro-
ducing the clean (dirty) good as well as the welfare eﬀect associated with an
increase in the consumer price of the dirty good in country h, respectively.
Next, consider Proposition 1;
13Proposition 1 If the resource allocation is a noncooperative Nash equilib-
rium, then the shadow price of environmental damage over the shadow price














































for h = C,D,w h e r eλh,∗ = λhˆ V
h,2
B /γ and ˜ X
h,i
d is the compensated domestic
demand for the dirty good by agent-type i in country h.
Since the formula in Proposition 1 is calculated in the same general way
as the corresponding formulas in previous studies, the proof is omitted. The
terms in the ﬁrst row of the formula are equivalent to, and have the same
interpretations as, their counterparts in previous studies. The ﬁrst term
in the ﬁrst row is the sum of the marginal willingness to pay for reduced
environmental damage. The second term reﬂects the self-selection constraint;
as such, it provides an incentive for the government to increase (decrease)
the marginal value it attaches to reduced environmental damage, if the low-
ability type is willing to pay more (less) than the mimicker for a marginal
reduction of the environmental damage. Finally, the third term is a tax base
eﬀect, which arises because the environmental damage aﬀects the demand for
the dirty good. These eﬀects are well known from previous studies and need
not be further discussed here. Note, however, that in contrast to previous
studies, the ’environmental feedback eﬀect’ is equal to one (although the
utility function is not separable). This reﬂects the fact that, from the point
of view of the government in country h, the aggregate worldwide consumption
14of the dirty good is unaﬀected by a change in Eh (see the discussion at the
end of the previous subsection).
The second row of the formula in Proposition 1 is novel; it is due to
producer price eﬀects associated with Bh and Eh. To understand this part
of the formula, one should bear in mind that µh/γh is calculated by using
the ﬁrst order conditions for Eh and Bh. As a consequence, a change in
Eh will here be accompanied by a simultaneous change in Bh,i,s u c ha st o
balance the government’s budget. This is, in turn, interpretable to mean
that Bh,i changes in such a way, that the utility remains unchanged. We
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B is the slope of an indiﬀer-
ence curve for ability-type i in

Eh,Bh,i
space. We show in the Appendix
that ΨD
d + ∆D/γD > 0 and ΨC
d + ∆C/γC < 0. Using equation (26), it is
easy to interpret the second row of the formula in the proposition. The term
∂Ph
d /∂Eh within the square bracket appears because a change in the envi-
ronmental damage aﬀects the producer price of the dirty good. However,
to maintain budget balance, the government needs to adjust Bh,i (captured
by ∂Bh,i/∂Eh) which, in turn, aﬀects the producer price (∂P h
d /∂Bh,i). If
the terms within the square bracket sum to a positive number, they will
contribute to increased welfare in the country producing the dirty good and
reduced in welfare in the country producing the clean good. Therefore, if the
sum within the square bracket in equation (26) is positive (negative), then
it contributes to decrease (increase) the shadow price in country D and to
increase (decrease) the shadow price in country C.
153.2 Commodity Taxation
Let us now turn to the optimal commodity tax structure. In the Appendix,
we derive the following result;
Proposition 2 If the resource allocation is a noncooperative Nash equilib-





































for h = C,D,w h e r eΩh =
S
i ∂ ˜ X
h,i
d /∂Qh
d,w h i l eΨh
d is deﬁned by equations
(23) and (24).
The most important consequence of Proposition 2 is that µh/γh does not
appear as a direct argument in the formula for the commodity tax. The
intuition behind this result was presented above; the government in country
h perceives that the commodity tax cannot be used as an instrument to aﬀect
the aggregate demand for the dirty good.
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side reﬂects a standard result in the
optimal tax literature and implies that the commodity tax may be used as




d > 0 (< 0), there
is an incentive to increase (decrease) the commodity tax in order to make
mimicking less attractive.
The second term on the right hand side of the tax formula in Proposition
2 captures a direct eﬀect of th
d via the producer price. Since the demand
curves are downward sloping (meaning that Ωh < 0), and since we were able
to show that −1 < ∂Ph
d /∂th
d < 0, it follows that ΨD
d /[ΩD(1 + ∂P h
d /∂tD
d )] > 0
and ΨC
d /[ΩC(1 + ∂Ph
d /∂tC
d )] < 0. As such, the sign of the second term in
the tax formula ultimately depends on the sign of the expression within the
16square bracket. This expression reﬂects, in turn, how a change in th
d aﬀects the
producer price, if Bh is simultaneously adjusted to balance the government’s





d ∂Pd/∂Bh,i), then the second term on the right hand side contributes
to decrease the commodity tax in country D and increase the commodity
tax in country C. From the perspective of country D, a lower commodity
tax contributes to increase the world market price in this case. The latter
implies an increase in the national income and, therefore, higher welfare in
country D. The opposite argument applies to country C.
3.3 Eﬀective Marginal Tax Rates
In the previous subsection, we saw that the commodity tax on the dirty good
does not contain any term, which explicitly serves the purpose of correcting
for the external eﬀect of environmental damage. However, such a term will
inﬂuence the income tax structure in the country that produces the dirty
good. To see this, we consider the eﬀective marginal tax rates. Deﬁne the


























































Our purpose is to relate the eﬀective marginal tax rates to the marginal
value of reduced environmental damage facing each government, as well as


























































for h = C,D,w h e r eεh = nhφh
n/φh > 0. Consider Proposition 3;
Proposition 3 If the resource allocation is a noncooperative Nash equilib-

































In Proposition 3, αh reﬂects two inﬂuences of the self-selection constraint;




low-ability type, and (ii) the decision variables implicit in the eﬀective mar-
ginal tax rate facing the low-ability type, (Bh,1,L h,1),a ﬀect the self-selection
constraint via the wage ratio. Similarly, βh captures that the decision vari-
ables implicit in the eﬀective marginal tax rate facing the high-ability type,
(Bh,2,L h,2),a ﬀect the self-selection constraint via the wage ratio. Therefore,
in the absence of environmental damage, and if the incentives associated with
production specialization were absent, this means that the low-ability type
18faces a positive eﬀective marginal tax rate, while the high-ability type faces a
negative eﬀective marginal tax rate. This is analogous to the results derived
by Stiglitz (1982).
In addition to the conventional eﬀects associated with the self-selection
constraint, we would like to emphasize three other aspects of the tax formulas
in the Proposition. First, and in contrast to many previous studies, note that
none of the formulas reﬂect demand induced changes of the environmental
damage. The intuition is that, although Bh and Lh aﬀect the domestic
demand for the dirty good, the government in country h perceives that a
change in the domestic demand has no eﬀect on the aggregate worldwide
demand and, therefore, no eﬀect on the environmental damage.
Second, the marginal income tax rate in the country that produces the
dirty good constitutes an instrument by which the government can reduce






sions for the eﬀective marginal tax rates facing the residents in country D.
If µD/γD > 0, which appears to be a reasonable assumption, there is an in-
centive to increase the eﬀective marginal tax rate. This reduces the hours of
work and, therefore, the output of the dirty good. Country C, on the other
hand, behaves as if it has no instrument available by which to inﬂuence the
environmental damage.
Third, the producer price eﬀects also show up in the context of the eﬀec-
tive marginal tax rates, where ηh,i captures how Bh,i and Lh,i aﬀect the world
market producer price. These terms are analogous to the producer price ef-
fects discussed in the context of the commodity tax formulas in Proposition
2.
194 Summary and Discussion
In this paper, we characterize the optimal income and commodity tax struc-
ture in a two-country economy, where one of the countries produces a clean
good, while the other produces a dirty good. The dirty good is assumed to
be consumed in both countries, and the aggregate demand for the dirty good
causes environmental damage. As a consequence, the economy is character-
ized by a transboundary environmental problem.
The results show that, if each country chooses its policy in isolation, the
commodity tax on the dirty good does not contain any term that directly
serves to correct for the external eﬀect associated with environmental dam-
age. For a given level of production, each national government acts as if a
reduction in the domestic demand for the dirty good leads to a corresponding
increase in consumption elsewhere. Therefore each country behaves as if its
commodity tax structure does not aﬀect the aggregate worldwide demand for
the dirty good. In fact, the country that produces dirty good may have in-
centives to choose a relatively low commodity tax; this reduces the producer
price of the dirty good which, in turn, increases exports and domestic wel-
fare. The results also imply that the country producing the dirty good may
internalize part of the domestic external eﬀect by choosing a higher marginal
income tax rate than it would otherwise have done. The intuition is that a
higher marginal income tax rate reduces the labor supply and, therefore, the
production of the dirty good.
In order to highlight important mechanisms characterizing open economies
with production specialization, we have taken the produciton specialization
argument to its extreme point, in the sense that each country only produces
one good. A more general approach would be to assume that both coun-
20tries produce, say, the clean good. This extension would imply that the
production of the country that produces the dirty good consists of two sec-
tors, where the output in each sector is a function of the producer price.
Within such a framework, a commodity tax on the dirty good may indirectly
aﬀect the environmental externality, since the change in the producer price
caused by an increase in the commodity tax inﬂuences the distribution of
resources between the two production sectors. Another possible extension
would be to allow for migration between countries. Introducing migration
implies that the country not producing the dirty good may, nevertheless, be
able to inﬂuence the output of the dirty good via the eﬀe c t so ft a xp o l i c yo n
migration.
Although our model is highly stylized, the results discussed above have
important implications for public policy. One such implication is that coun-
tries not producing goods that give rise to environmental damage may have
no obvious instrument by which to directly aﬀect the environmental dam-
age. Such countries are likely to beneﬁt from supranational environmental
agreements. Another is that countries producing goods that give rise to
environmental damage have incentives to internalize, at least in part, the
corresponding domestic welfare eﬀects. As such, they are less likely to gain
from supranational agreements than countries not producing the dirty goods.
5 Appendix
The ﬁrst order conditions for government D are written (where the sup-
perindex D has been suppressed)
210=−V
1





































































































































The ﬁrst order conditions for government C are analogous, except that the
terms µ(∂F/∂L1) and µ(∂F/∂L2) in equations (A1) and (A3) disappear.
Note also that equation (A.5) implies ΨD
d +∆D/γD > 0 and ΨC
d +∆C/γC < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2;
Start by diﬀerentiating the consumer’s budget constraint in equation (2)







































































































































Substituting equations (A8) and (A9) into equation (A5) and then using










































Solving for td gives the tax formula in Proposition 2.
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